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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v*

:

Case No. 930034-CA

NUEL L. HARRIS,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated assault, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103
(1990), and attempted robbery, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101, 76-4-102, and 76-6-301 (1990).

This

Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f ) (1992) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court commit reversible error by considering
uncharged criminal conduct contained in defendant's presentence
report when

sentencing

defendant pursuant

to a plea bargain

agreement?
"'This Court does not disturb a sentence unless it exceeds
that prescribed by law or unless the trial court has abused its
discretion.' State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986); State
v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d

885, 887-88

(Utah 1978).

An abuse of

discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge were

'inherently unfair' or if the judge imposed a 'clearly excessive'
sentence.

State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887."

State v. Strunk,

205 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 17-18 (Utah 1993) (Hall C.J., dissenting).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
This case may be disposed of solely on the basis of caselaw.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In August of 1992, defendant and three other individuals were
charged with

aggravated

sexual assault, forcible

aggravated robbery (R. 06-08).

sodomy, and

Defendant waived his preliminary

hearing and was bound over to district court, where he entered a
plea of not guilty (R. 03, 16-17).

On November 30th, after the

trial court granted defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of not
guilty, defendant entered a guilty plea to one count of aggravated
assault and one count of attempted robbery (R. 26-27). On December
28th, defendant was sentenced to two consecutive zero to five year
terms at the Utah State Prison (R. 36-37).

He then filed a timely

appeal (R. 39).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The underlying factual scenario in this case involved four
men, all transients, who forcibly sexually assaulted and robbed a
woman, also a transient, at a motel in Salt Lake County (R. 74-76).
All

four men originally were charged with aggravated

sexual

assault, forcible sodomy, and aggravated robbery (R. 06-07).

In

defendant's case, the charges were reduced to one count each of
aggravated assault and attempted robbery, in exchange for his plea
of guilty (R. 26-27).

The trial court then sentenced defendant to
2

two consecutive zero to five year terms in the Utah State Prison
(R. 36-37).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

State concedes

that the trial court, in sentencing

defendant, improperly considered the criminal charges that had been
dismissed as a result of defendant's plea bargain with the State.
However, because the court's sentence fell within the limits of
what was permissible for the crimes that were actually charged and
because the court stated

sufficient and appropriate reasons,

totally apart from the improper considerations, for the sentence it
imposed, the sentence should be upheld.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT, THE TRIAL COURT
IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED CRIMINAL CHARGES WHICH
HAD BEEN DISMISSED AS A RESULT OF DEFENDANT'S
PLEA BARGAIN WITH THE STATE.
The State concedes that, in sentencing defendant, the trial
court erred in considering the unproven charges which had been
dismissed as a result of defendant's plea bargain with the State.
Defendant's plea only admitted the facts constituting the lesser
crime, as stated in the plea agreement.

His plea "does not

presuppose the truth of the facts pleaded in the [information]."
People v. Griffin, 166 N.E.2d 684, 199 N.Y.S.2d 674, 7 N.Y.2d 511,
515-16 (1960).
When defendant entered the plea to the lesser charges of
aggravated assault and attempted robbery, he did so in exchange for
giving up his right to have a jury determine his guilt or innocence
3

on the original charges of aggravated sexual assault, forcible
sodomy, and aggravated robbery.

In essence, he gave up that right

only on the condition that the original charges be dismissed. See
State v. Womack, 319 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1982). Dismissal of criminal
charges as part of a plea bargain is the functional equivalent of
acquittal of the charges, which would preclude consideration of
their underlying facts for the purpose of imposing sentence to the
reduced charges.

People v. Griffin, 7 N.Y.2d at 515.

Accord

People v. Harvey, 25 Cal.3d 754, 758, 159 Cal. Rptr. 696, 699
(1979).
Utah has dealt directly with this issue only in the context of
a capital case, where the supreme court held "that the sentencing
body -- be it judge or jury —

may not rely on other violent

criminal activity as an aggravating factor supporting a death
penalty unless it is first convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused did commit the other crime."

State v. Laffertv, 749

P. 2d 1239, 1260 (Utah 1988). The rationale underlying this rule is
that reliance on criminal conduct not resulting in a conviction
could be unfairly prejudicial to a defendant because such reliance
could tip the scales to a sentence of death when the defendant had
never actually been proven to have committed the alleged crime.
Id. at 1259. An analogous rationale, it would seem, applies to the
instant case.

If the court's sentencing decision rests on the

unproven charges as stated in the information, defendant could well
be unfairly prejudiced by receiving a punishment for an unproven
and unadmitted crime.

See State v. Womack, 319 N.W.2d at 19-20.
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There are some inconsistencies
in the
statements of the defendant.
There is not
inconsistency in the fact that she was
viciously and brutally beaten about her face
and there was also evidence of her having been
sexually assaulted.
(R. 85).
And, finally, the court stated:
The offense was characterized by extreme
cruelty or depravity.
And I think holding
someone down and multiply beating her or
raping her, and that certainly falls in that
category, and there are multiple charges here,
and the defendant's attitude is not conducive
to supervise [sic] in a less restrictive
setting, I certainly agree with those
aggravating
circumstances in this case and
feel that incarceration in the Utah State
Prison is warranted and required under the
circumstances.
(R. 86).
In the first instance, the court used the equivocal phrase,
"this victim claims."
also evidence."

In the second, the court stated, "there was

In the final instance, the court used the

alternative "beating her or raping her" (emphasis added).

In all

three instances, the references to the sexual conduct could be
omitted entirely and the reasonableness of the remaining part of
the ruling would still be manifest.
Absent these references or even if the court improperly
considered this information, the court's ruling contains sufficient
and appropriate reasons to sustain the sentence imposed. See State
v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 912-13 (Utah 1988) (either one or two
aggravating circumstances found by court were sufficient to support
the sentence imposed); State v. Robison, 811 P. 2d 500, 504 (Idaho
6

-* ~ : •
infoiiriatxO.

states

sentence i m p o s e d ) .

T h e crux -;f the court's

•

. w ^ . sulfide:.-

reoSw .s

n

t.

.-pport

.. , ing revolves around

:

] \. i i L I .a] "

busia.iieu;

eviuence:;

Furthermore,
(- *

*

^

.*tn

• v:ldinu

"unusuaxi}

sown

*-

m
exter.s. e

anc tuen

severel

~^.^s.

treating r.er ,

in in 11 I I,

Additionally,

the

,..ar;

noted

I III

nai.ir

..a^

-.. his

possession property belonging Lu Lhe victi::. of the assault"" (R.
86)
Furthermore, after having rled guilty to the lesser charges,
defendar*

.-.^^- the opportunity -

s

*ke a statement at t h e

i

a

charges t ,. v n ; * :,e r:ad plec
t h a + iefendar*

'lis prompted tne :; ^r: tc uoserve

r-^?r :rp ! ' 1. 1 j not serve [ M m ] w e ]

c

*
±ess

to supervise :

^ ,. . _

..

i rie

3-

TTr c

'-

<=- •"^jr^ ^ l i e d

rr-mari

r

tai^ure

~i^

t«

<v

i

i the

r

accept

s^ter.ced

responsibility

defendant

--mid

prescribed r\

-t . r: ; .

. . _

defendant's

offenses.

1e

restrictive sett::.

;. c^m+'o^^ r.,-7 defenda* •

on

^*~ *•*-.?= t*me,f

T

;r a uant

dS

fcr the
^"

the
s

i

rcumstances, tre crurt

did n o t a b u s e its d i s c r e t i o n , and its sentence should b e affirmed.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
sentence.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this | g d a y of June, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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face value.
MR. LOYD: And the Court will recall that that's
also contained in the Defendant's Certificate and Statement
and was part of the plea bargain.
THE COURT:

Is there any legal reason why sentence

cannot be imposed at this time?
MR. LOYD: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Harris, you have been found guilty
of one Count of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony,
and one Count of Atttempted Robbery, a Third Degree Felony.
I have listened to what you said and the comments of your
counsel•
I'd first note, Mr. Harris, at the time that you
entered your plea to both of those Counts I went over with
you in great detail whether you were, in fact, guilty of
those offenses.

I think at this point to come into this

Court at the time of sentencing and deny responsibility for
the offenses you have admitted to does not serve you well at
this time.
What happened in this case is that the victim in
this case, who was also transient, was brutally and viciously
attacked.

And the facts are that Jamie Barnhart, your

co-defendant, and you approached this victim.

She held her.

And this victim claims to have been multiply raped anally,
vaginally and sodomized.

That this woman was beaten about
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her face, and then she was left. And she identified you,
Mr. Harris, as well as Miss Barnhart and also the other
co-defendants, one of whom was prepared to testify against
you and the other co-defendants.
Also, the facts in this case as alleged by the
victim are that before the preliminary hearing —

and I hear

what you say, Mr. Loyd that someone approached her and said
that Red Bone says, If you don't go to court and testify,
everything will be forgotten; if you do you'll get hurt.
Then she indicated that she was going to have to testify and
she was attacked and her leg was broken.
That'8 what the victim alleges in this case.

I

understand that you deny it.
And I accept what you say, Mr. Loyd.

And I am

going to, in the sentence the Court imposes, consider that
and weigh that very heavily.

That that's contrary to what

she represented to you when you interviewed her.
There are some inconsistencies in the statements
of the defendant.

There is no inconsistency in the fact that

she was viciously and brutally beaten about her face and
there was also evidence of her having been sexually
assaulted.
The recommendation of Adult Probation & Parole —
first of all, based upon your criminal history ~

and

sometimes I really don't understand how such a vicious crime
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could come out with a recommendation for probation.

But in

any event, there is a recommendation by Adult Probation &
Parole that the Court depart upward from the guidelines for
the reasons that in their judgment Mr. Harris represents a
serious threat of violent behavior, that the victim in this
case was particularly vulnerable, that the injury to the
person was unusually extensive. And I might add, also
Mr. Harris had in his possession property belonging to the
victim of the assault.
The offense was characterized by extreme cruelty
or depravity.

And I think holding someone down and multiply

beating her or raping her, and that certainly falls in that
category, and there are multiple charges here, and the
defendant's attitude is not conducive to supervise in a less
restrictive setting, I certainly agree with those aggravating
circumstances in this case and feel that incarceration in the
Utah State Prison is warranted and required under the
circumstances.
Well, having said that, it is the judgment and
sentence of this Court, Mr. Harris, that you be sentenced to
the terms prescribed by law for each of these offenses,
namely:

zero to five years in the Utah State Prison for each

offense. Also, I am aware that you don't have substantial
funds available to you by any means in light of your
lifestyle*

And the fine, although clearly a greater fine

008G

16
could be justified in this case, I don't think that one would
make any sense because I don't think you have the ability to
pay a greater fine. The Court orders that you pay a fine in
the amount of $1,000 plus an 85 percent surcharge.

That is

consistent with the recommendation of Adult Probation &
Parole•
With regard to whether you should be —

whether

these sentences should be consecutive or concurrent, first of
all I'd make a note that I don't think a 90-day diagnostic
evaluation would serve any useful purpose in this case. And
I very often consider that if the Court is willing to place
someone on probation, and I do not feel that is warranted in
this case. And I think that incarceration at the Utah State
Prison is appropriate punishment, Mr. Harris.
I think that this was a particularly vicious crime
against someone who was very vulnerable.

Multiple people

attacking one person makes that victim even more vulnerable
than usual.

It seems to me, Mr. Harris, that the

recommendation of Adult Probation & Parole is appropriate.
And therefore, I am following that recommendation and
sentencing you consecutively to the Utah State Prison.
I am also going to order that you pay —

be

jointly and severally responsible for victim restitution for
the injuries that she claims to have suffered.

That is the

judgment and sentence of the Court.
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